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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

statutory limitations by Judge Abraham Sofaer
popular support for a target government, atand a thoughtful analysis by Kenneth de Graf- tacks elements of the target government's civilfenreid of the lack of any formal mechanism in ian infrastructure that have no military use but
the American policy-making process for consid- whose destruction could increase popular diseration of moral issues raised by proposed uses content-for example, the civilian electrical
grid. Is such a use of force aimed purely at causof force.
This book's discussions of the application of ing hardships to civilians ever permissible either
thejust war concept to low-intensity conflict and legally or morally, even if it involves no direct
of the related issue of the capacity of interna- loss of life? Fourth, the discussion of American
tional law to take into account the range of con- domestic constraints on low-intensity conflict
siderations employed in just war analysis are in- fails to consider contemporary attitudes toward
teresting and provocative. Further, a number of the risks of combat. Fifth, the connection bepoints made in the work are sure to stimulate tween the concluding chapter and the rest of
debate-for example, the argument made by the book is not entirely clear; in other words, it
both Turner and Judge Sofaer that, while situa- is difficult to relate several of the recommendations may present themselves requiring the tions to the conference papers and discussions.
United States to violate international law, the Finally, while the conference was primarily conhealth of the international legal system de- cerned with modes of ethical analysis associated
mands that such violations be admitted and ex- with the just war tradition, it would have been
interesting to have had at least some discussion
plained rather than obfuscated.
However, certain aspects of the book limit its of other approaches as well. For example, a conutility somewhat. First and most basically, the sideration of low-intensity conflict employing
book contains no really satisfactory definition John Rawls's "veil of ignorance" approach
of the phenomenon it addresses-low-intensity might yield insights additional to or different
conflict. Second, the section on international from those reached through ajust war analysis.
In sum, while this work has some gaps and
legal constraints on low-intensity conflict conlimitations,
the questions it provokes make it a
centrates almost exclusively on whether the concept of self-defense set out in Article 51 of the useful starting point for anyone setting out to
UN Charter would permit an armed response think about the complex and interesting issues
to a low-intensity conflict launched against a of law, morals and uses of force raised by lowstate by another state. But this approach begs a intensity conflict short of full-scale war.
number of important questions. Should there
A. MARK WEISBURD
be a legal difference under Article 51 between a
University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill
situation in which a state foments an insurgency
School of Law
elsewhere that remains entirely dependent on
the sponsoring state, a situation in which a state
foments an insurgency that takes on a life of its Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea. By Ronald B.
Mitchell. Cambridge MA. MIT Press, 1994.
own while continuing to receive aid from the
Pp. xii, 346. Index. $36.50.
original sponsor, and a situation in which a state
provides assistance to a genuinely indigenous
Ronald Mitchell raises two endemic and eninsurgency? What is the legal status of low- twined questions that perennially challenge lawintensity operations, such as provision of sup- yers and policy makers dealing with internaport for groups opposed to an unfriendly gov- tional law in general, and international environernment-as given by the United States in both mental law (IEL) in particular. First, do treaty
Guatemala and Iran in the 1950s-which are rules matter and can they change behavior? Sechard to fit under any reasonable definition of ond, can the lessons learned from the internaself-defense? Third, with the exception of the tional regulation of relatively moderate and limdiscussions byJohnson and O'Brien of the ethi- ited occurrences, such as vessel-based oil pollucal standing of assassination (in which they tion, be applied to the control of other, more
reach somewhat different conclusions), neither
serious and widespread environmental probthe legal nor the ethical sections of the book lems, such as climate change and the protection
address certain of the most interesting specific of biodiversity, and, if so, to what extent.? Mitchtactical issues raised by low-intensity conflict, as ell, assistant professor of political science at the
contrasted with conventional warfare. Suppose, University of Oregon, brings his own disciplinfor example, that a state, in an effort to erode ary perspective and insights to bear on these
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important questions and answers, offering an
analysis that prompts a better understanding of
the nature and character of compliance, implementation and enforcement within the international legal process.
He answers the first question by reviewing the
theoretical overlay of treaty compliance and
then moves beyond this scholarly base with an
empirical study that examines the application
of treaties regulating intentional oil pollution
during the past forty years. The empirical data
lead him to conclude that treaty rules can positively influence international behavior at both
national (governmental) and corporate levels.
The answer to the second question, summarily
stated, is that the example of intentional oil pollution could be of use in other regimes, depending on the circumstances.
Do treaties make a difference? Much legal
analysis centers on the jural nature of treaties,
and their interpretation and applicability, making the a priori assumption that treaties do
shape and change the behavior of the relevant
parties. It is therefore useful to be reminded
about the substantial body of realist thinking
that defines international behavior and practice
in terms of geopolitical power rather than law.
According to the realists, nations agree to treaties and the rules therein embodied because
they codify the existing or intended behavior or
practice of the parties. Parties conform their
behavior to treaty provisions because it is in
their self-interest to do so, not because they are
obliged to by law. The realists argue that it
would be a mistake to equate this spurious correlation with true causation, as international
lawyers tend to do. Despite the strenuous exhortations and exertions of international lawyers,
realist thinking is alive and well.
The author, a pragmatic institutionalist who
believes that treaties do change behavior, nonetheless accepts the existence of such realist skepticism, and examines the empirical evidence offered by intentional oil pollution to determine
if the realist argument has been rebutted. After
evaluating the evidence drawn from the control
of intentional oil pollution, the author concludes that the empirical evidence repudiates
the realist thesis and "unequivocally demonstrates that governments and private corporations have undertaken a variety of actions involving compliance, monitoring and enforcement
that they would not have taken in the absence
of relevant treaty provisions" (p. 299). Building
upon this premise, he proceeds to establish a

[Vol. 91 •

strong case by demonstrating that some primary
rules of obligation institutionalized within the
legal regimes created by IEL beget greater compliance than others, for a cluster of reasons.
One of the reasons relied upon by the author
is that some rules fall within the "incentiveability-authority triangle." He offers illuminating explanations of ability and authority that
are worthy of close attention. By "ability" he
refers not only to the practical ability to comply
with rules, but also to situations where the ability
to violate rules was actually reduced. His concept of "authority" is the power of national governments to take action against polluting ships.
He illustrates that coastal states desisted from
acting against polluters because of doubts about
their jurisdiction to inspect and detain ships.
This shortcoming was remedied only when the
thorny questions ofjurisdiction were seized by
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL), which
granted coastal states the right of inspection
and detention. The granting of such power or
authority led to much better enforcement and
greater compliance with its rules.
The need for nations and their domestic institutions to be possessed of authority to proceed
against foreign private entities that commit environmental wrongs, rather than their foreign
governments, is cogently pressed home by the
author. He further argues that the experience
of oil pollution demonstrates why it is important
that nation-states be given the right to use trade
sanctions as a way of protecting the international environment. This strand of the author's
conclusions can be interwoven with another of
his more striking points: the importance of encouraging "hegemonic" or "leader" governments to influence compliance by other states.
Such a thesis makes great sense in light of the
checkered experience of the United States, a
leader state that has exercised benign and beneficial power to protect dolphins and other endangered marine species, but has been assailed
for doing so because of countervailing free
trade obligations.
The author discerningly divides treaty regimes, or "treaty compliance systems" as he
calls them, into three parts: primary rules, compliance information systems and noncompliance response systems. "Primary rules" are substantive rules, traversing a rule's ultimate goals,
the methods of achieving them, implementation and enforcement. "Primary rules" refer to
all and any rules stipulating discharge limits or
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other environmental control measures, as well
as those applicable to monitoring, reporting
and judicial and administrative enforcement.
He does not address the doctrine of state responsibility and does not, therefore, deal with
the somewhat tortuous differences between primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of
responsibility drawn by the International Law
Commission.
Mitchell also embraces a wide province for
IEL. He sees it as one that extends beyond
wrongful acts, and doctrines of state responsibility based on the vindication of such wrongs, to
a more proactive and precautionary system directed at actual compliance or implementation
through machinery and mechanisms for securing compliance, and methods of patrolling noncompliance. The author thus clarifies and sheds
understanding on treaty regimes of primary
rules as consisting not only of substantive, goaloriented obligations, but also of other rules promoting or supervising compliance. He does not
isolate substantive rules from their implementation.
The author establishes a strong analytical
framework and develops it with imagination. It
is therefore disappointing that he does not deal
with the implications of his clear repudiation of
the realist thesis. If IEL and treaty rules make
a difference, is there something about the nature of treaty rules, apart from their political
appeal, that elicits compliance? The author
could have consolidated his position about the
value of rules by addressing the view that rules
result in compliance because they are IEL-a
social force in its own right that is greater than
the sum of those rules. IEL commands and receives respect because it is law. Despite its renowned asymmetry with municipal law and its
publicized defects in lacking a lawmaking and
law-enforcing sovereign, international law does
invoke compliance because it governs a lawabiding community of states, not a gang of bandits or bank robbers.I In this context, the author
could also have better canvassed the extent to
which a legal commitment to the "framework"
conventions set the stage for the more detailed
protocols.
Fortified by the strong foundation he has laid,
the author moves to answer the second question
posed-the extent to which the oil pollution
experience may be generalized. He reports that

I ROGER

FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE wITH IN-

TERNATiONAL LAw

16 (1981).

it sobn became evident that many of the lessons
from the limited area of vessel-based oil pollution could be used to control much larger and
more endemic problems of pollution. The most
striking of these are the patterns of regulation
falling within the "incentive-ability-authority triangle," and the "treaty compliance system."
These strategies are worthy of adoption, and
have in fact been adopted, to control a variety
of international environmental problems. It is
also evident that clarity serves compliance. In
IEL, as in other areas of international law, the
problem cases arise when actors confront aspirational norms creating general obligations, as
contrasted with result-specific rules that contain
definite duties.
One of the author's significant conclusions,
however, is open to criticism. He offers examples of successful and failed strategies: design
and engineering rules that induced compliance, as against emission limitations that did
not. While design and engineering standards
might have worked in the particular circumstances, this kind of rule gives rise to significant
doubts about its more general applicability.
Mitchell cites the examples of limitations on
the oil content of tanker discharges near shore,
institutionalized by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea
by Oil (OILPOL) in 1954, which were frequently
flouted and were replaced by ship-design standards providing for segregated ballast tanks
(SBT) in MARPOL, which have been successful
in reducing pollution caused by near-shore discharges..
The problem with this example is that it seeks
to replace discharge standards that allow shipowners the freedom to choose how they might
achieve such standards in the most efficient manner with procrustean uniform equipment or engineering standards that are much more expensive
and demonstrably inefficient. Such equipment
standards have been excoriated in domestic environmental settings as the worst examples of command and control regulation. The author appears to recognize this criticism and contends
that the more expensive and less efficient design
standards may be justified because they permit
much more effective compliance and enforcement. He is right, of course, and a strong case
can be made for more effective, in contrast to
more efficient, regulation. The problem that remains is whether nations would agree to similar
costs and expenses in analogous situations. There
were a number of nonreplicable factors present

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

in 1972 and 1978 that led to the improbable conclusion of the parties agreeing to a significantly
more expensive form of pollution control, These
facts are referred to by the author, but the implication that must surely be drawn is that they will
not easily be reproduced.
A few reservations do not detract from the
impressive achievement of Ronald Mitchell in
writing a very well analyzed, conceptually clear,
thoughtful, timely and well-conceived book that
offers many insights into the questions of treaty
compliance. His book should present IEL lawmakers, policy makers and practitioners with
ample food for thought.
LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY

University of Tulsa College of Law

The PrecautionaryPrincipleand InternationalLaw.
The Challenge of Implementation. (International
Environmental Law and Policy Series, Vol.
31.) Edited by David Freestone and Ellen
Hey. The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer
Law International, 1996. Pp. xv, 268. Index.
Fl 195; $130; £84.
In their conclusion to this collection of essays
on the precautionary principle, the two editors
remind the reader that the precautionary principle, while new as an environmental policy imperative, is not new as a human concept. Arguably, the principle's appeal to common sense underlies its remarkably swift international
acceptance. The failure of environmental policy
to prevent environmental degradation and the
emergence of various potentially irreversible environmental problems have forced international environmental law to take a new approach to uncertainty. Where risks of serious or
irreversible damage are identified but conclusive evidence is not available, a legal framework
demanding certainty cannot produce appropriate responses. This insight is now translated
into international environmental law and policy. Most recent legal instruments or policy documents endorse the general idea that absence
of conclusive scientific evidence should not be
used to postpone responses to threats of serious
or irreversible damage. However, although it
seems difficult to argue with this proposition,
the simplicity of this "better safe than sorry"
approach is more apparent than real. As the
title of the book suggests, the real challenge
lies in the implementation of the precautionary
principle-in determining in what cases, at

[Vol. 91

what point and to what extent precautionary
measures are warranted.
This volume, edited by Professor David Freestone of the University of Hull and Professor
Ellen Hey of Erasmus University, makes a true
contribution to revealing the many layers and
the complexity of these questions. It brings together leading experts from various disciplines
and backgrounds, including international lawyers, economists, scientists and policy makers.
The book is divided into three parts of roughly
equal length, framed by an introductory and a
concluding piece written by the editors. According to Freestone and Hey, the collection is
intended as a "second generation" contribution to the debate on the precautionary principle (p. 14). Consequently, rather than reexamining the rapid emergence and the legal status
of the precautionary principle, the book focuses
upon issues related to the principle's refinement and implementation.
Part I, The Legal Challenges of the Precautionary Principle, begins with a contribution by
Alexandre Kiss. He examines the important
links between the concept of intergenerational
equity and the precautionary principle, placing
most emphasis on the analysis of the former
concept. James Cameron andJuli Abouchar offer a detailed and informative exploration of
the precautionary principle's scope and status
in international law. Reviewing relevant literature and drawing upon a broad range of international documents and domestic sources, they
conclude that the precautionary principle has
become customary international law. In their
view, an agreed-upon core can be distilled from
the varied formulations of the precautionary
principle, although disagreements remain as to
the threshold at which the principle is triggered, whether it mandates only "cost-effective" or any necessary preventive measures, and
the impact of the concept of "common but differentiated obligations." Catherine Tinker, in
her article on the implications of the precautionary principle for the law of state responsibility, does not explicitly address Cameron and
Abouchar's arguments about the binding core
of the principle. However, she does suggest that
the principle's varied formulations would make
a finding of internationally wrongful behavior
and state responsibility difficult. Tinker argues
that the precautionary principle gives rise to a
series of procedural obligations, such as duties
to warn or notify, or requirements of environmental impact assessment. In her view, the prin-

